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INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY BELIEFS AND PREFERENCES FOR 
REDISTRIBUTION IN PORTUGAL1 
Abstract 
We conduct a randomized control trial to understand how beliefs about intergenerational 
mobility affect the attitude towards redistribution in Portugal and how information shapes those 
beliefs and preferences. When compared with France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, Portugal has higher concerns about inequality and supports more 
redistribution. Information about low mobility decreases the perceived chances of getting out 
of poverty but does not change preferences for redistribution. Contrarily to other countries, 
beliefs of mobility to the top are not sensitive to this information. When compared with true 
mobility, Portuguese are more pessimistic than Americans and Europeans. 
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1. Introduction 
In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith alerted for the consequences of inequality for social and 
political life (Rasmussen, 2016). The relevance of this topic grew in the twentieth century, as a 
consequence of the Great Depression (1929-1933) and the subsequent crisis. Today, the 
increasing concentration of income at the top 1 percent of the income distribution is considered 
by many as “the major social issue of our time” and a reflection of the inability of public policies 
to provide equality of opportunity and equality of income (Stiglitz, 2013; Piketty, 2014). 
 
Income differences across the distribution are sharp around the world and Portugal is no 
exception. In 2018, the individuals in the bottom 20 percent of the disposable income 
distribution in Portugal accounted for less than 8 percent of total disposable income, while the 
20 percent richest hold more than 40 percent (Eurostat, 2018). It is thus clear that there is 
inequality of income. But do people consider it a problem? If so, do they support the 
implementation of more redistributive policies? According to Eurobarometer (2018), compared 
with the European Union (EU) average, Portuguese put a higher way on the role of “being 
lucky”, “coming from a wealthy family” and “having political connections” to get ahead in life. 
Portugal appears as a country particularly skeptical of the “American Dream” - the idea that 
with effort and hard work everyone can make it to the top. Interestingly, while Portugal is the 
EU country with fewer people placing themselves in the upper quintile (20 percent richest) - 
only 3 percent compared with 9 percent EU average - it is also above average on perceptions 
of upward mobility vis-à-vis their parents.2 Regarding inequality perceptions, in Portugal it is 
almost consensual that current differences in people’s income are too large - 96 percent of the 
 
2 France, Finland and UK respondents have low perspectives of upward intergenerational mobility but place 
parents in a higher position of the social ladder. Portuguese respondents, on the other hand, place parents in the 
lowest position of the ladder. This suggests that individual expectations of upward mobility in Portugal are a 
result of it being a poor country in the EU context, in which there is still room for improvement between 
generations.  
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respondents agree. Additionally, 94 percent of the respondents believe the government should 
act to reduce these differences.  
 
Perceptions of rising inequality have been motivating the debate about the demand for 
redistribution. Early political economy models from Meltzer and Richard (1981) found a 
positive relationship between current income inequality and demand for redistributive policies. 
According to these authors, the poor should be the main advocates of redistribution. Cruces et 
al. (2013) prove that overestimating the relative position, i.e. to consider oneself richer than she 
is, leads to a decrease in demand for redistribution. Piketty (1995) notes that, if individuals do 
not know their true chances of moving up the social ladder and since learning this is costly, 
demand for redistribution depends vastly on social mobility beliefs, rooted in previous 
generations’ income mobility experience, as well as personal experience. Moreover, the 
macroeconomic environment affects preferences for redistribution. Giuliano and Spilimbergo 
(2014), using data from 1972 to 2010 for 37 countries, show that individuals who experience a 
recession are more risk-averse, less confidence on upward mobility, tend to believe that success 
depends more on luck than effort and support more redistribution.  
 
In sum, social mobility beliefs can be shaped by many factors, which in turn are key to 
understand demand for redistribution. But how do these beliefs about mobility affect 
redistributive preferences across countries? And can information play a role in shaping those 
beliefs and preferences? We aim to study how social mobility is perceived in Portugal, how 
that affects preferences for redistribution and compare it with the results found for European 
countries and the US. We conduct a randomized controlled trial (RCT), following the 
methodology used by Alesina et. al (2018) and making use of our identification strategy, we 
test whether providing information about low mobility changes preferences for redistribution. 
We believe our questions are key to public policy since the degree of responsiveness of fiscal 
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and tax policies to voters’ redistributive preferences has been proven to be very high. Page and 
Shapiro (1983), using public opinion and policy data for the US, from 1935 to 1979, show 
evidence that policymakers react vastly to public opinion. Also, Soroka and Wlezien (2005), 
using data from the UK, show that public spending is positively correlated with public opinion’s 
demand for spending. 
 
Our key findings are as follows. By comparing our results to those of Alesina et al. (2018) for 
France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, we show that Portuguese are 
more confident on the chances of getting out of poverty but more skeptical of the odds of getting 
rich. These perceptions vary based on individual characteristics, such as education, household 
income, and political orientation. Portuguese have higher concerns about inequality of 
opportunities, believe that the government has the ability and the tools to mitigate them and 
displays higher support for redistributive policies. Information about low intergenerational 
mobility impacts the perceived chances of getting out of poverty but has no impact on 
redistributive preferences. Contrarily to what happens in the other countries, beliefs regarding 
mobility to the top are not sensitive to this information. Finally, when comparing mobility 
beliefs with true mobility, Portuguese are not only less confident on upward mobility (to the 
upper quintiles) than Americans, but also more pessimistic than Europeans.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the survey methodology 
and presents our data. Section 3 displays the results and is divided into four subsections: 
Subsection 3.1 compares social mobility perceptions, policy preferences and views on 
government between Portugal, other EU countries and the US; Subsection 3.2 shows the 
heterogeneity of mobility perceptions in Portugal; Subsection 3.3 presents the link between 
mobility perceptions and demand for redistribution in Portugal; and Subsection 3.4 reports the 
experiment results. Section 4 compares the perceived and the actual social mobility and, finally, 
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Section 5 concludes, presents the implications for public policy and discusses avenues for future 
research. 
 
2. Empirical Assessment  
2.1 The Method 
Our study builds on the work by Alesina et.al (2018), which methodology we follow closely to 
render the comparison meaningful. To understand the role of information on shaping mobility 
beliefs and how they affect preferences for redistribution, we conduct a survey 3 with five 
blocks of questions. The first block relates to views on the fairness of the Portuguese economic 
system, the second looks at personal mobility experience, the third assesses respondents’ views 
on political institutions, the fourth inquires beliefs on mobility and support for redistributive 
policy preferences and the fifth collects respondents’ demographic characteristics. Before the 
fourth block, we build a randomized control trial (RTC), in which half of the sample is 
randomly presented with an image with information about low intergenerational (upward and 
downward) mobility in Portugal. The treatment’s goal is to evaluate the impact of information 
on low mobility on preferences for redistribution. For comparison purposes, the treatment had 
to be homogenous across countries, hence the same information shown to all respondents from 
Alesina et al. (2018) is shown to our Portuguese respondents. For this reason, the treatment 
does not provide exact statistics of actual mobility in Portugal, but only qualitative statements 
about the low probability of a child born in a poor family becoming rich and a child born in a 
rich family becoming poor. Figure 1 presents the image seen by the treatment group. 
 
 








To evaluate the treatment effects, we follow a two-stage method. First, to isolate the effect of 
the treatment on the mobility perceptions, we regress these perceptions on the treatment, 
controlling for a vector of individual-level characteristics (𝑋")4. Then, we regress the first-stage 
treatment effects on various redistributive policies, described in Table 1. Our first-stage 
regression in equation (1) and our reduced-form outcome regression in equation (2) are both 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors. 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦" = 𝑐 + 𝛽2	𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡" + 𝛽7𝑋" + 𝜇"  
𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦" = 𝑐 + 𝛾2	𝑀𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦" + 𝛾7	𝑋" + 𝜖" 
 
TABLE 1. LIST OF VARIABLES 
Mobility Probability 
Stay Poor The perceived probability of a child born in the first quintile remaining in the first quintile. 
Improve  The perceived probability of a child born in the first quintile moving to the second or third quintile. 
Get Rich The perceived probability of a child born in the first quintile moving to the fourth or fifth quintile. 
(Continued) 
 
4 𝑋" is composed by the following variables: gender (female), age less than 45 (young), being in the top quartile 
of the income distribution (rich), having a college degree (college), political orientation (left/right) and having a 
job with a status higher than father (move up). Table 2 provides more information on these variables.  
Notes: In the left-hand side respondents are informed that it is extremely rare for a child born in a poor family 
to become rich later in life. On the right-hand side, the figure says that it is extremely rare for a child born in a 




TABLE 1. LIST OF VARIABLES (Continued) 
Redistributive Policy 
Tax Rate Top 1 The average tax rate respondents consider fair for the families of the richest 
1 percent. 
Tax Rate Bottom 50 The average tax rate respondents consider fair for the families of the poorest 50 percent. 
Share Taxes Top 1 Taxation burden supported by the top 1 percent. 
Share Taxes Bottom 50 Taxation burden supported by the bottom 50 percent. 
Budget opp. 1 if the respondent preferred spending on opportunities (education and health care), as a share of the total government budget, it is above percentile 75th. 
Budget Safety Net  1 if the respondent preferred spending on safety net (social security), as a share of the total government budget, it is above percentile 50th. 
Support AIMI 1 if the respondent strongly agrees with the capital tax. 
Support equality opp. 
policies 
1 if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the implementation of more 
policies promoting equality of opportunities. 
Unequal opp. very serious 
problem 
1 if the respondent believes that children from poor and rich backgrounds 
having unequal opportunities in life are “a serious problem”.  
Views on Government 
Trust Gov 
1 if the respondent says that the government can be trusted to do what is right 
“most of the time” or “always”. 
Gov Tools 
1 if the respondent thinks that the government has the ability and the tools to 
do “some” or “a lot” to reduce inequality of opportunities. 
Lowering Taxes Better 
1 if the respondent thinks that “lowering taxes on wealthy people and 
corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth” is better 
than “raising taxes (...) to expand programs for the poor” to reduce inequality 
of opportunities.  
Negative View Gov 
1 if the respondent answers that he/she can “never” trust the government, or 
that to reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born in poor 
and rich families the government has the ability and the tools to do “nothing 
at all” or “not much,” or that “lowering taxes on wealthy people and 
corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth” would be 
the better way to equalize opportunities. 
 
Questions about policy preferences are divided into two groups: taxes and budget spending. In 
the former, to evaluate the desired progressivity of the tax system, we ask respondents to choose 
the average income rates they believe to be fair for each of four income groups: the top 1 
percent, the next 9 percent, the next 40 percent and the bottom 50 percent. To assess people’s 
preferences for capital taxes, we ask them to rate their support for the Additional to the 
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Municipal Property Tax5 (AIMI, in Portuguese, popularly known as “Imposto Mortágua”6), 
instead of the estate tax used by Alesina at al. (2018). The AIMI is a property tax, paid only by 
the owners of very high-value properties, and, in 2018, only a small percentage of house owners 
paid this tax7. Respondents are warned about this in advance. Regarding fiscal policy, 
respondents are asked to do their state budget, i.e., to allocate a percentage of the budget to five 
spending categories: Defense and National Security, Public Infrastructure, Public Spending on 
Education, Social Security, and Public Spending on Health. 
 
2.2. The Data 
The survey was developed in Qualtrics, a software platform to conduct survey research. It was 
disclosed and shared over social media, for three weeks, from September 15th, 2019 until 
October 4th, 2019, with a total sample size of 1066. The median time of completion was 13 
minutes and observations with less than 5 minutes were dropped.8 
 
From the analysis of Table 2, we can see that there are no significant differences between the 
treated and the control groups. Unemployed respondents are more likely to quit the survey since 
they are under-represented in the treated group as compared to the control group. However, 
given that the survey was performed online, and thus only submitted responses are received, 
we cannot calculate attrition rates. Having said this, considering that differences between the 
number of respondents in each group are small, and unemployed individuals account for only 
3 percent of our sample, we are confident that selection effects do not bias the results.  
 
 
5 The AIMI is an additional tax to the property tax IMI (“Imposto Municipal sobre Imóveis”). The taxable basis 
corresponds to the sum of the Tax Registration Value (determined based on the type of property) of all the urban 
properties held by the taxpayer. 
6 To better fit the Portuguese case, the preferences for capital taxes are represented by the property tax that became 
known in Portugal by the name “Imposto Mortágua”, popularly named after the left-wing deputy from the political 
party Bloco de Esquerda, Mariana Mortágua, who advocated for it.  
7 According to the Portuguese tax authority (Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira), in 2018, only 6.31 percent of 
house owners paid the AIMI tax. 
8 The survey was conducted in the period before the legislative national elections on October 6th. 
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Our samples provide a good representation of the population, but it is highly biased towards 
higher income and education (Appendix A.1). Nevertheless, it is aligned with Eurobarometer 
(2018) data on social mobility. Comparing answers to the question “Nowadays in (our country) 
I have equal opportunities for getting ahead in life, like everyone else” from Eurobarometer 
(2018) and our survey question “How do you feel about the following statement: In Portugal, 
everybody has a chance to make it and be economically successful”, we see that outcomes by 
education level are similar. In our sample, the agreement rate is composed of 25 percent of 
individuals with secondary education and 68 percent with higher education, while in the 
Eurobarometer (2018) data, the agreement rate is 19 percent and 50 percent, respectively9. 
Moreover, regarding the overrepresentation of rich individuals in the sample, one could be 
concerned that this may bias the results towards lower tax rates to the richest (Meltzer and 
Richard, 1981). However, self-interest is not the only driver of policy preferences. Blinder and 
Krueger (2004), using data for the USA, concluded that ideology is more important to 
determined policy preferences than self-interest. Singhal (2008), using OECD data, shows that 
redistributive preferences can be altruistic, and people do not necessarily support lower tax rates 
at income levels close to theirs. Additionally, Canela and Vicente (2018), using data from post-
election polls of preview legislative elections, show that, in Portugal, in 2015 elections, those 
from the top quintile of the income distribution voted 20 percentage points more than those 
from the bottom quintile. Considering preferences are expressed via voting, the unbalance in 
the sample may be a good representation of the actual voting preferences for redistribution. 
Nonetheless, we are aware of the external validity limitations of our study. 
 
9 We only consider secondary and higher education since it constitutes 96% of our sample. Since this question is 
placed after the treatment, we only consider the answers from the control group. 
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Full sample Control group Treated group 






1 if the respondent believes the economic 
system in Portugal is “fair, there are equal 
opportunities”. 
0.120 0.325 0.103 0.305 0.136 0.343 
Trust Gov 
1 if the respondent answers that he or she can 
trust the government to do what is right “Most 
of the time” or “Always” (it takes value zero if 
the answer is “Never” or “Only some of the 
time”). 
0.130 0.336 0.115 0.319 0.145 0.353 
Unequal opp. 
problem 
1 if the respondent believes that if children 
from poor and rich backgrounds have unequal 
opportunities in life this is “A problem” or “A 
serious problem” or “A very serious problem” 
(equal to zero if it is “Not a problem” or “A 
small problem”). 
0.970 0.171 0.970 0.175 0.971 0.168 
Female 1 if the respondent is female. 0.610 0.488 0.610 0.488 0.609 0.489 
Young 1 if the respondent is less than 45 years old. 0.483 0.500 0.478 0.500 0.487 0.501 
Rich 
1 if the respondent’s household income is 
above the 75th percentile (above 
50.000€/year) of the respondents’ household 
income distribution in the country. 
0.199 0.399 0.175 0.380 0.223 0.417 
Married 1 if the respondent is married. 0.555 0.497 0.544 0.499 0.565 0.496 
College 1 if the respondent has a college degree. 0.774 0.419 0.777 0.417 0.771 0.421 
Move up 1 if the respondent considers the status of their job to be higher than his father’s one. 0.480 0.500 0.484 0.500 0.475 0.500 
Left 1 if the respondent positions himself at the left side of the political spectrum (1 to 4).10 0.500 0.500 0.467 0.500 0.528 0.500 
Right 1 if the respondent positions himself at the right side of the political spectrum (6 to 10). 0.176 0.381 0.172 0.379 0.180 0.385 
Lisbon or 
Oporto 1 if the respondent is from Lisbon or Oporto. 0.735 0.422 0.754 0.432 0.716 0.452 
Big city 1 if the respondent believes to live in a big city. 0.500 0.500 0.519 0.500 0.481 0.500 
Rural Area 1 if the respondent believes to live in a rural area. 0.120 0.325 0.117 0.322 0.122 0.327 
Employed 1 if the respondent is in the labor market working for others. 0.605 0.489 0.593 0.492 0.617 0.487 
Self-
employed 
1 if the respondent is a self-employed or a 
small business owner. 0.082 0.275 0.077 0.268 0.087 0.282 
Unemployed 1 if the respondent is unemployed. 0.033 0.179 0.046 0.209 0.020* 0.141 
Notes: * Statistically different from the average values of the control group at 90% 
 
 
10 As commonly used in European Social Survey (ESS)’s questionnaires, the political spectrum is defined on a 
scale of 1 to 10, where 1 represents the most left-wing position and 10 the most right-wing position. 
 11 
3. The Results 
This section is divided into four subsections organized as follows. First, we focus on a cross-
country analysis between Portugal, France, Italy, Sweden, the UK and the US regarding 
mobility perceptions, government views, public spending, and taxes. Second, focusing on our 
novel data on Portugal, we analyze how individual characteristics relate to mobility beliefs. 
Third, we explore the link between mobility beliefs and attitudes towards redistribution and, 
finally, we present the experiment that aims to study if this link is a result of a casual effect.  
 
3.1. Portugal, the most European of All 
We learn from Alesina et al. (2018) that Europeans display higher skepticism regarding social 
mobility than Americans. Our data shows that, in Portugal, confidence in the chances of upward 
mobility to the upper quintiles is even lower than the average of the EU countries (Figure 2). 
Overall, these results are aligned with Eurobarometer (2018), in which Portuguese respondents 
are 38 percent less likely than the EU average to agree with the statement “Nowadays I have 
equal opportunities for getting ahead in life, like everyone else”. 
 
Interestingly, in our data, Portugal is more confident about the chances of getting out of poverty. 
Respondents believe that, for those born in a poor household, getting rich is unlikely, but there 
is room for improvement to the so-called “lower middle class” and “middle class” (second and 
third quintiles). According to Eurobarometer (2018), countries such as France, Finland, and the 
UK, in which respondents place parents in a higher position of the social ladder are also the 
ones with lowest perspectives of upward intergenerational mobility. On the other hand, 
Portuguese respondents display higher confidence in going farther than their parents, while 
placing parents in the lowest position of the ladder. This suggests that confidence in improving 
up the social ladder may be motivated by Portugal being a poor country in the EU context, 
where there is still room for moving up from generation to generation. 
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Regarding public spending preferences, Figure 3 shows that Portugal presents high support for 
spending on education and health (budget opportunities) and on safety net (budget safety net). 
Regarding taxation, Portuguese respondents support a lighter burden for the bottom 50 percent 
and heavier for the top 1 percent, ergo, desire for tax system progressivity seems to be higher 
in Portugal than in the EU average. Support for capital taxation11 is also higher in Portugal than 
in France, Italy, and Sweden. Overall, Portugal seems to have a higher demand for policies and 
taxes that promote redistribution. This was an expected result, since, as presented in Section 1, 
94 percent of the Eurobarometer (2018) Portuguese respondents want more government 
intervention. Additionally, Olivera (2013), using the European Social Survey (ESS) data on 33 
countries between 2002 and 2010, shows that Portugal is the 5th country with higher preferences 
for redistribution. In this ranking France appears in 8th place, followed by Italy in 13th, Sweden 
in 25th and the UK in 31st. 
 
11 Note that to evaluate support for capital taxation, we used a property tax - AIMI - to better fit the Portuguese 
reality,  instead of the estate tax used by Alesina et al. (2018). 
Notes: The figure shows, for each country, the perceived probability of each mobility possibility as defined in 
Table 1. Only the control group is considered to avoid the influence of treatment effects on mobility 
perceptions.  The “+” represents the average of each variable for the EU countries studied by Alesina et. al 
(2018). Source: Own computations for Portugal and calculations for USA, UK, France, Italy and Sweden from 
Alesina et. al (2018). 
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Nonetheless, even if individuals have high preferences for redistribution, demand for these 
policies can be low if people do not trust the government, or do not believe it has the tools to 
tackle inequality or believe lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage 
investment in economic growth is the most efficient way to mitigate inequality (Kuziemko et 
al., 2015). Figure 4 shows that Portuguese respondents have lower negative views on 
government, mainly a result of the high confidence in its capacity and tools (93 percent of 
respondents agree). Portugal seems to trust the government as much as the other countries, 
except for Sweden which is an outlier in this matter. Additionally, in Portugal and the US, 31 
and 32 percent of the respondents, respectively, believe that “lowering taxes on wealthy people 
and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth” is the most efficient way 
to decrease inequality, rather than by “raising taxes (…) to expand programs for the poor”. 
Given the starting level of taxes in Portugal is higher than in the US (Alesina and Glaeser, 
2006), this does not reflect a desire for a less progressive Portuguese tax system. Overall, 
Portugal appears as the country in which more individuals see unequal opportunities as a 
problem, which, in addition to the belief in government’s ability and tools to tackle inequality, 
may explain the higher support for redistribution in the country. 
 
FIGURE 3.  POLICY AND TAX PREFERENCES BY COUNTRY (%) 
 
Notes: The figure shows, for each country, the policy and tax preferences as defined in Table 1. Only the 
control group is considered to avoid the influence of treatment effects on policy preferences. The “+” 
represents the average of each variable for the EU countries studied by Alesina et. al (2018). Source: Own 








3.2. Heterogeneity in Mobility Perceptions in Portugal 
Alesina et al. (2018) show that beliefs on intergenerational mobility vary with individual 
characteristics. For France, Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the US, left-wing individuals assign a 
higher probability to stay in the bottom quintile, whereas females, low-income respondents and 
individuals with higher education are more likely to give a higher probability to move to the 
top. To understand the heterogeneity of mobility perceptions in Portugal, we compare the mean 
perceptions of mobility for different individual characteristics. Figure 5 shows that, in Portugal, 
having a college degree, being rich and being left-wing are characteristic that significantly 
increase the perceived odds of staying poor and decrease confidence in the chances of getting 
rich. In line with Alesina et al. (2018), the youth is both less confident in the chances of getting 
out of poverty and more confident in the probabilities of getting rich. Those who consider their 
job’s status to be better than the one their fathers had (“move up”), are less likely to believe that 
a child born in a poor household will remain stuck there. This finding is consistent with 
Piketty’s (1995) idea that personal mobility experience impacts one’s beliefs on social mobility. 
On the other hand, considering unequal opportunities a problem significantly increases the 
Notes: The figure shows, for each country, average views on government as defined in Table 1. Only the control 
group is considered to avoid the influence of treatment effects on views on government. The “+” represents the 
average of each variable for the EU countries studied by Alesina et. al (2018). Source: Own computations for 




perceived chances of staying poor. Regarding attitudes toward the “American Dream”, females, 
left-wing individuals and those who classify inequality of opportunities as a problem are less 
likely to believe that social mobility in Portugal is possible for everybody. The opposite is true 
for right-wing individuals and, as expected, those who believe the Portuguese economic system 
is fair. 
 
FIGURE 5. HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS IN PORTUGAL 
 
 
3.3. Mobility Perceptions and Preferences for Redistribution in Portugal 
As previously discussed in Section 1, social mobility beliefs are a key determinant of demand 
for redistributive policies. To analyze whether this link is present in our sample, we regress 
respondents’ policy preferences on their perceived mobility probabilities, controlling for a 
vector of individual-level characteristics (Xi), as presented in Subsection 2.1. To avoid 
capturing the effects of the treatment’s information, we report the regression results only for 
respondents in the control group. From the analysis of Table 3, we see that assigning high 
probability to “Stay Poor” increases the perception of inequality of opportunities as a serious 
problem, while being confident in the odds of “Get Rich” is significantly correlated oppositely. 
Contrarily to Alesina at al. (2018), we do not find a significant correlation between mobility 
perceptions and preferences for all redistributive policies under analysis. Nevertheless, there is 
Notes: The figure shows the difference of the average perceived probability of “Stay Poor”, “Improve” and “Get 
Rich”, as well as the belief in the “American Dream”, for different groups of respondents. The groups are defined 




a significant correlation for policies that intend to reduce current inequalities through 
progressive taxation and social transfers to the poorest, namely spending on safety net budget 
and higher tax rates for the top 1 percent. Overall, these policies seem to be more sensitive to 
mobility beliefs than policies that aim to create conditions for more even distribution in the 
future through investment in education and health care (budget opportunities). Note, however, 
that more or less share of budget spending on a certain category depends on that initial 
benchmark of each respondent, which is unknown. This may explain why support for equality 
of opportunities policies is not sensitive to mobility beliefs, contrarily to other countries.  
 
TABLE 3. RELATION BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS ON MOBILITY AND POLICY PREFERENCES 




















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Stay Poor -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003*** 0.002* 0.108** -0.020 
Get Rich -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009*** 0.000 -0.278** 0.041 
Obs. 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 
Notes: The table reports, for the control group, the estimates of regressions of mobility perceptions on the 
redistributive policies of each column. The outcome variables are defined as described in Table 1. Controls 
included in all regressions are the vector of individual-level characteristics (Xi), presented in Subsection 2.1. 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own calculations. 
 
3.4. The Experiment: Causal Effect of Mobility Beliefs on Policy Preferences 
The results so far suggest that beliefs about mobility are linked to some policy preferences, 
namely progressive taxation and social transfers to the poorest, but they do not show that one 
led to the other. To understand if this is a result of causal relation or just a consequence of 
individual characteristics, such as views on government, cultural values, ideology or others, we 
conduct an RCT, as explained in Section 2. 
a) First Stage: Treatment Effects on Beliefs 
Table 4 shows that the treatment only has a significant effect on changing beliefs of the 
probability of “Improve” up the social ladder. On average, all else equal, the treated group 
decreases by 3.54 percentage points the perceived probability of a child born in the bottom 
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quintile moving to the second or third quintile. Even though the treatment does not include 
information on mobility to the middle of the income distribution, the framing of the message 
may lead respondents to focus on the nine poor kids who do not move, instead of focusing on 
the one kid that does. Figure 6 shows that there is no difference between control and treated 
group regarding the perceived probabilities of “Get Rich” for any moment of the distribution. 
Respondents seem to either not believe in the information in the treatment or simply ignore it, 
which then translates into no change in mobility beliefs to the top. Moreover, Table 4 shows 
that being left- or right-wing does not affect the results, contrarily to Alesina et al.’s (2018) 
conclusions to other countries. 
 
In sum, information seems to have a significant but small effect on mobility beliefs on the odds 
of getting out of poverty to the following quintiles but has no impact on the other beliefs. Our 
results suggest that if politicians cite data on social mobility, they will not convince the 
Portuguese that mobility is different than they initially thought. One possible explanation for 
this resistance to information may be the experience of recent adverse events (Giuliano and 
Spilimbergo, 2014), such as the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent 2010 sovereign debt crisis, 
which had a particularly strong effect on Portugal in comparison to the remaining countries in 
the analysis. Olivera (2014), using the European Social Survey (ESS) data on 23 countries in 
2008 and 2010, shows that Portugal experienced an increase of more than 5 percent in support 
of redistribution after the crisis. This adverse experience may have let Portuguese less confident 
on upward mobility to the top and suspicious of any different information. That been said, 
further research is needed to understand the rigidity of these beliefs, and how they emerge and 
reproduce. 
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TABLE 4. FIRST-STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS 
 Stay Poor Improve Get rich 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Mobility perceptions 
Treated 2.248 -3.541** 1.036 
Panel B. Mobility perceptions for left- and right-wing 
Treated x Left 2.134 -1.751 0.386 
Treated x Right -0.266 -2.851 3.914 
Left 4.654 -2.224 -2.471 
Right 1.970 0.119 -2.123 
P-values    
diff. 0.631 0.812 0.190 
joint test (Left) 0.899 0.951 0.948 
joint test (Right) 0.845 0.926 0.365 

















b) Treatment Effects on Policy Preferences 
Table 5 reports the treatment effects on redistributive policy preferences, which shows that, 
albeit the success of the treatment on altering the perceptions of getting out of poverty, these 
preferences do not change. As before, being left- or right-wing does not affect the results. To 
endorse our conclusions, we follow an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, in which we use 
Notes: The table reports first-stage effects on mobility perceptions. Panel A reports the coefficients of the regression 
between the treatment and mobility perceptions. Panel B reports the same but with the treatment interacted with 
political orientation. P-values: diff. is the p-value of the test of equality of the effects among left- and right-wing 
respondents; joint test (Left) is the p-value of the test of equality of effects among left- and non-left-wing respondents; 
joint test (Right) is p-value of the test of equality of effects among right- and non-right-wing respondents. The 
outcome variables are defined as described in Table 1. Controls included in all regressions are the ones of equation 
(1). ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Notes: The perceived probability of a child born in the first quintile move to the fourth or fifth quintile later in 
life for the treated (red) and the control group (black). 
 
FIGURE 6. GET RICH PERCEIVED PROBABILITY 
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the treatment as an instrument for mobility perceptions. Since the first-stage treatment effects 
are only significant at altering the perceived probability of “Improve”, we use the “Improve” 
instrumented by a dummy for being in the treatment group as our IV. We can assume that the 
treatment had no effect on policy preferences except through mobility perceptions since we 
simply replicated the treatment designed by Alesina et al. (2018), elaborated with the exclusion 
restriction12 in mind. Additionally, we test if the treatment has any impact on views of 
government and do not detect any significant effect. In any case, following an IV approach does 
not change the results, which reinforces our conclusions: we do not find evidence of a causal 
link between policy preferences and perceived odds of “Improve” in Portugal. 
 
Jaime-Castillo and Marques-Perales (2014), using a Spanish sample, show that lower 
confidence on mobility to the top of the social ladder leads to greater support for redistribution. 
Nonetheless, in our sample, information is not capable of changing the perceived odds of 
getting rich, hence nothing can be said about the causal relationship between these perceptions 
and preferences for redistribution in Portugal. Therefore, from our experiment, we can only 
conclude that mobility perceptions from the bottom to the “lower middle class” or the “middle 
class” do not shape preferences for redistribution in Portugal. For all we know, these 
preferences can be formed by beliefs of mobility to the top or can even be inelastic and not a 
consequence of misinformation (Kuziemko et al.’s, 2015). Previous literature shows that these 
preferences can be a result of cultural values (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), racial stereotypes 
(Kuklinski et al., 2003), political orientation or views on government (Alesina et al., 2018).  
 
12Respecting the exclusion restriction criteria necessary to conduct an IV estimation, the treatment affects policy 
preferences but is not correlated with other factors affecting the outcomes. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A. Treatment effects  
Treated -0.028 0.047 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.554 -1.116 
Panel B. Treatment effects for left- and right-wing 
Treated x Left 0.048 0.034 -0.033 -.057 0.085 -3.076 -0.503 
Treated x Right 0.103 -0.013 0.006 0.075 -0.119 1.866 1.55 
Left -0.058 0.152*** 0.052 0.138** 0.118** 6.139** -0.896 
Right 0.040 -0.087 -0.097 -0.160** -0.043 -4.168 -0.660 
P-values 
diff. 0.584 0.571 0.588 0.197 0.737 0.282 0.371 
joint test (Left) 0.375 0.985 0.438 0.574 0.245 0.476 0.872 
joint test (Right) 0.256 0.733 0.830 0.736 0.221 0.987 0.522 
Panel C. IV estimates 
Improve 0.008 -0.013 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.171 0.307 
Panel D. IV estimates for left and right-wing 
Improve x Left 0.002 -0.031 -0.005 0.013 0.019 0.402 0.801 
Improve x Right -0.013 -0.024 -0.016 -0.024 0.032 -0.907 0.409 
Left -0.152 1.818 0.330 -0.555 -0.924 -16.443 -43.742 
Right 0.762 1.213 0.721 1.083 -1.795 43.169 -22.190 
P-values        
diff. 0.621 0.8379 0.7813 0.3991 0.6819 0.460 0.552 
joint test (Left) 0.996 0.319 0.666 0.762 0.434 0.833 0.3244 
joint test (Right) 0.790 0.402 0.625 0.805 0.433 0.816 0.517 
Obs. 692 692 692 692 692 692 692 
Notes: This table reports the treatment effect on policy preferences (Panels A and C) and the treatment effects interacted 
with political orientation (Panels B and D). Panel C and D scale these effects by regressing the policy listed in the 
column on the perceived probability of “Improve”, instrumented by a dummy for being in the treatment group. The 
outcome variables are defined as described in Table 1. Controls included in all regressions are the ones of equation (2). 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Own calculations. 
 
4. (Mis)perceptions: Actual and Perceived Social Mobility 
One of our key results is that, in Portugal, confidence in social mobility to the top is not only 
lower than in the US but also lower than in other European countries. Portuguese respondents 
believe only 8 kids, out of 100, will reach the upper quintiles, while this number climbs to 20 
among other Europeans and 23 for Americans. 
 
To assess if mobility perceptions are accurate, Figures 7, 8 and 9 display the average perceived 
probability of “Stay Poor”, “Improve” and “Get Rich”, respectively, against the actual mobility 
in each country13. For Portugal, our data source for actual mobility is the OECD, based on EU-
 
13 Appendix A.8 shows the deviation between the actual and the perceived probabilities of each transition. 
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SILC (2011-14). The “children’s sample” is composed of males, and the “parents’ sample” 
composed by fathers from the first quartile. To our knowledge, this is the best available data 
for Portugal. However, the OECD data are divided into quartiles, while in our survey data are 
divided into quintiles. Hence, to make meaningful comparisons, we consider the first, second 
and third quartile to correspond to our first, second and third quintiles, respectively, and the 
fourth quartile to correspond to our fourth and fifth quintiles. Regarding the average perceived 
mobility, we only considered respondents in the control group to eliminate changes in 
perceptions based on the information provided by the treatment. For the remaining countries, 
information comes from Alesina et al. (2018). 
 
Three main results stand out. First, there seems to exist systematic misperceptions across 
countries. European countries are all more pessimistic about the probability of remaining in 
poverty and less optimistic about getting rich than Americans. This result is presented in 
Alesina et al. (2018) and it is consistent with previous literature (Tocqueville,1835; 
Piketty,1995; Alesina and La Ferrera, 2005). Second, Portugal is very pessimistic about the 
probability of staying stuck in poverty and vastly underestimates the probability of making it 
to the top. Nonetheless, it is an optimist about the chances of moving from poverty to the second 
and third quintiles. Third, Portugal is the country in which more children “Stay Poor” and less 
“Get Rich”. Yet withal, chances of “Improve” are higher in Portugal and, as our survey data 
proves, respondents are aware of it. 
 22 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper aims at understanding how beliefs about intergenerational mobility affect the 
attitude towards redistribution in Portugal and how information shapes those beliefs and 
preferences. We conduct a randomized control trial and compare the results for Portugal with 
those from a similar survey on other countries (Alesina et al., 2018). The analysis is 
complemented with data from other existing datasets, namely the Eurobarometer (2018) data 
on “Fairness, Inequality and Intergenerational mobility”, and the OECD data on actual 
intergenerational mobility in Portugal. 
 
We show that Portuguese are skeptical of mobility to the upper classes (fourth and fifth 
quintiles) but confident on the chances of moving from poverty to the “lower middle class” and 
Notes: Probability of a son being in first  quintile (Figure 7), in the second or thrid quintile (Figure 8) and in the 
fourth or fifth quintile (Figure 9), conditional on his father being in the same quintile. The dotted line is the 45-
degree line. Source: For Portugal, OECD calculations based on EU-SILC (2011-14) for actual mobility and own 
calculations for average perceived mobility; for the remaining countries, Alesina et al. (2018)  
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“middle class” (second and third quintiles). These perceptions vary based on individual 
characteristics, such as education, household income, and political orientation. By comparing 
our results to those of Alesina et al. (2018) for France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, we show that skepticism regarding mobility to the top and confidence on 
chances of getting out of poverty are higher in Portugal. Moreover, the Portuguese have higher 
concerns about inequality of opportunities and believe that the government has the ability and 
the tools to mitigate them. Support for redistributive policies is also higher in Portugal. When 
mobility perceptions are compared with true mobility, Portuguese are not only more pessimistic 
than Americans but also more pessimistic than other Europeans. 
 
From our RCT, we conclude that information about low intergenerational mobility impacts 
perceptions on the chances of getting out of poverty but has no impact on redistributive 
preferences. Contrarily to what happens in the other countries, Portuguese respondents are not 
sensitive to the information in the treatment regarding mobility to the top. Therefore, from our 
experiment, we can only conclude that mobility perceptions from the bottom to the “lower 
middle class” and “middle class” do not shape preferences for redistribution in Portugal. 
Nonetheless, nothing can be said about the causal link between mobility perceptions to the top 
and preferences for redistribution in Portugal. The role of information seems to be significant 
but small on mobility beliefs about getting out of poverty to the subsequent quintiles but does 
not affect the other beliefs. Therefore, our results suggest that if politicians cite data on upward 
social mobility, they will not convince the Portuguese that mobility is different than they 
thought. We propose that the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent 2010 sovereign debt crisis 




Overall, our results must be interpreted with caution. First, high-income and higher-educated 
individuals are overrepresented in our sample and hence it is not representative of the 
population. While this has no impact on the internal validity of the results, it may affect the 
external validity. Also, the sample is considerably smaller than Alesina et al.’s (2018) one, 
which not only limits the comparison with the countries covered but also limits our ability to 
explore richer outcomes derived from interactions among variables (as the number of 
observations in each group becomes too small). Finally, our data on perceived and actual social 
mobility is not perfectly aligned. Considering the latter is divided into quartiles while the former 
is divided into quintiles, approximations are required, and hence comparations should be made 
carefully. 
 
Finally, and while our results are informative, they can be enhanced in a several ways. First, 
further research is needed to understand the rigidity of mobility beliefs to the top, and how they 
emerge and reproduce. Second, it would be very useful to understand if and to what extent the 
recent financial and sovereign debt crisis created these rigid beliefs in Portugal and if so, its 
impact on demand for redistribution. Third, the geographical disparities in perceptions in 
Europe raise the question of where people’s beliefs about social mobility come from: is it the 
media or the cultural history of each country? Finally, to ensure the external validly of these 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
 





Female 0.61 0.53 
Young 0.58 0.50 
Rich 0.20 0.03 
Household size 2.9 2.5 
Married 0.56 0.47 
College 0.77 0.25 
Employed and self employed 0.69 0.55 
Unemployed 0.03 0.07 
Obs. 694  
Notes: This table displays summary statistics from our survey sample (1) alongside nationally representative 
statistics (2). Portuguese population’s data source: Pordata. 
 
APPENDIX A.2. HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS 
 Stay Poor Improve Get Rich American dream alive 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Female (423) 38.520 53.045 8.434 0.106 









     
Young (359) 42.213 48.213 9.574 0.143 









     
Move up (333) 37.219 54.102 8.679 0.141 









     
College (537) 40.989 51.159 7.853 0.123 














APPENDIX A.2. HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS (Continued) 
 Stay Poor Improve Get Rich American dream alive 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Rich (138) 44.657 49.474 5.869 0.138 









     
Econ system fair (83) 40.217 49.663 10.120 0.434 









     
Unequal opp. prob (673) 39.623 52.192 8.185 0.116 









     
Left-wing (345) 41.749 50.988 7.262 0.087 









     
Right-wing (122) 39.516 52.351 8.820 0.213 









Notes: The table reports average mobility perceptions for different groups of respondents and the difference 
between them. Standard errors in parentheses. The outcome variables are defined as described in Table 1 of the 
paper. The dependent variables are defined as described in Table 2 of the paper. ∗p < 0.1,	∗∗ p < 0.05,	∗∗∗ p < 
0.01. Source: Own calculations.  
 
APPENDIX A.3. VIEWS ON GOVERNMENT BY POLITICAL ORIENTATION 
 Trust Gov Gov. tools Lowering taxes better Neg views government 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Left-wing 0.062 0.012 -0.231 -0.266 
Right-wing -0.070 -0.031 0.282 0.245 
p-value diff. 0.003 0.312 0.000 0.000 
Obs. 349 349 340 349 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of regressions of political orientation on views of government for the control 
group. The outcome variables are defined as described in Table 1. Controls included in all regressions are the 
vector of individual-level characteristics (Xi), presented in Subsection 2.1. Source: Own calculations. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX A.4 DEMAND FOR REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES BY POLITICAL ORIENTATION 



















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Left -0.055 0.158*** 0.059* 0.142** 0.116** 6.247** -0.924 
Right 0.031 -0.090 -0.116* -0.182** -0.039 -3.817 -0.890 
P-value diff.  0.250 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.037 0.003 0.985 
Obs. 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of regressions of political orientation on different redistributive policies for 
the control group. The outcome variables are defined as described in Table 1. Controls included in all regressions 
are the vector of individual-level characteristics (Xi), presented in Subsection 2.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
APPENDIX A.5. DETAILED PERCEIVED TRANSITION PROBABILITIES BY COUNTRY 
 
Stay Poor  Improve Get Rich Obs. 
 (1) (2) (3)  
USA 0.322 0.442 0.237 2170 
UK 0.378 0.416 0.206 1290 
France 0.353 0.451 0.196 1297 
Italy 0.336 0.450 0.214 1242 
Sweden 0.320 0.476 0.204 881 
EU average 0.350 0.460 0.190 6880 
Portugal 0.379 0.542 0.079 349 
Notes: The table reports average mobility perceptions for each country and the EU average. Only the control group 
is considered to avoid the influence of the treatment effects on mobility perceptions. The outcome variables are 
defined as described in Table 1. Source: Own computations for Portugal and calculations from Alesina et al. (2018) 
from the remaining countries. 
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APPENDIX A.6. VIEWS ON GOVERNMENT BY COUNTRY  





Negative View of 
Government 
Obs. 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
US       
All 0.23 0.75 0.32 0.83 0.59 1 731 
Left 0.30 0.85 0.14 0.92 0.39 464 
Right 0.17 0.63 0.56 0.74 0.78 517 
UK       
All 0.17 0.82 0.24 0.85 0.50 759 
Left 0.09 0.89 0.11 0.93 0.40 257 
Right 0.37 0.75 0.44 0.75 0.65 167 
France       
All 0.06 0.48 0.51 0.89 0.85 769 
Left 0.08 0.53 0.32 0.94 0.75 249 
Right 0.06 0.48 0.66 0.84 0.91 307 
Italy       
All 0.08 0.73 0.44 0.94 0.71 735 
Left 0.10 0.76 0.33 0.96 0.60 335 
Right 0.05 0.69 0.61 0.92 0.84 238 
Sweden       
All 0.50 0.81 0.29 0.91 0.53 454 
Left 0.59 0.90 0.07 0.99 0.23 137 
Right 0.46 0.78 0.53 0.84 0.74 193 
Portugal       
All 0.11 0.93 0.31 0.97 0.47 349 
Left 0.15 0.93 0.14 0.98 0.29 163 
Right 0.05 0.92 0.64 0.95 0.77 60 
Notes: The table reports average views on government for each country for all respondents of each country and 
for left- and right-wing respondents. Only the control group is considered to avoid the influence of the treatment 
effects on views on government. Outcome variables are defined as in Table 1. Source: Own computations for 





































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) 
US 
         
All 25.22 7.86 0.35 0.07 0.35 32.73 13.51 851 1 731 
Left 28.10 5.96 0.39 0.05 0.51 35.22 15.03 216 464 
Right 22.49 10.05 0.31 0.08 0.20 29.08 11.86 261 517 
UK 
         
All 37.15 6.50 0.28 0.10 0.32 41.30 13.36 758 758 
Left 39.97 5.67 0.31 0.08 0.44 42.12 14.45 256 257 
Right 34.65 6.89 0.26 0.10 0.26 41.52 12.19 167 167 
France 
         
All 43.71 8.51 0.18 0.12 0.22 38.59 13.37 769 769 
Left 47.07 6.92 0.19 0.09 0.31 39.95 14.81 249 249 
Right 42.70 9.59 0.17 0.13 0.18 37.09 12.31 307 307 
Italy 
         
All 37.75 10.37 0.19 0.14 0.23 38.99 15.70 732 735 
Left 38.66 9.04 0.19 0.12 0.31 40.15 15.55 335 335 
Right 34.74 11.44 0.17 0.15 0.14 38.33 15.37 235 238 
Sweden 
         
All 50.81 22.50 0.11 0.17 0.28 43.03 14.52 454 454 
Left 53.49 22.23 0.11 0.17 0.49 43.26 16.67 137 137 
Right 46.99 23.32 0.10 0.17 0.16 43.25 13.07 193 193 
Portugal 
         
All 46.38 11.83 0.38 0.10 0.29 53.21 20.35 347 347 
Left 50.21 11.32 0.40 0.09 0.20 53.10 21.20 163 163 
Right 39.82 11.73 0.38 0.11 0.13 52.92 18.90 60 60 
Notes: The table reports average policy preferences for each country for all respondents of each country and for 
left- and right-wing respondents. Only the control group is considered to avoid the influence of the treatment 
effects on policy preferences. Outcome variables are defined as in Table 1. Source: Own computations for Portugal 











APPENDIX B.  SURVEY 
1. Do you think the Portuguese economic system is: 
1. The economic system in Portugal is fair, there is equal opportunity; 2. The 
economic system in Portugal is unfair, there is no equal opportunity 
2. Do you think you can rely on political institutions to do the right thing? 
1. No, never; 2. Sometimes; 3. Yes, most of the time; 4. Yes, always 
3. Children from poor and rich families not having the same opportunities in life is: 
1. Not a problem; 2. A small problem; 3. A problem; 4. A serious problem.; 5. A very 
serious problem 
4. Some people do not vote today. Will you go to the next legislative elections in Portugal on 
6 October 2019? 






US UK FR IT SW PT
Accurancy of mobility percenptions
Stay Poor Improve Get Rich
Notes: The figure shows, for each country and each quintile transition, the difference between the actual 
and the perceived mobility. “Stay Poor”, “Improve” and “Get Rich” are defined as described in Table 1.  
 
APPENDIX .8. ACCURACY OF MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS 
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5. Level of education: 
1. First cycle (4th year); 2. Second cycle (6th grade); 3. Third cycle (9th grade); 4. 
Secondary Education (12th grade); 5. Degree; 6. Postgraduate; 7. Master; 8. 
Doctorate 
6. Were you ever employed? 
1. Yes; 2. No 
7. What is your current employment status? 
1. Full-time employee; 2. Part-time employee; 3. Self-employed or small business 
owner;4. Unemployed and looking for work; 5. Student; 6. Not in labor force (for 
example: retired, or full-time parent) 
8. Father’s level of education: 
1. First cycle (4th year); 2. Second cycle (6th grade); 3. Third cycle (9th grade); 4. 
Secondary Education (12th grade); 5. Degree; 6. Postgraduate; 7. Master; 8. 
Doctorate 
9. If you compare your job (or your last job if you currently do not have a job) with the job 
your father had while you were growing up, would you say that the level of status of your job 
is: 
1. Much higher than my father's; 2. Higher than my father's; 3. About equal to my 
father’s; 4. Lower than my father's; 5. Much lower than my father's; 6. My father did 
not have a job while I was growing up OR my father was not present  
10. Mother’s level of education  
1. First cycle (4th year); 2. Second cycle (6th grade); 3. Third cycle (9th grade); 4. 
Secondary Education (12th grade); 5. Degree; 6. Postgraduate; 7. Master; 8. 
Doctorate 
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11. If you compare your job (or your last job if you currently do not have a job) with the job 
your father had while you were growing up, would you say that the level of status of your job 
is:  
1. Much higher than my mother's; 2. Higher than my f mother's; 3. About equal to my 
mother's; 4. Lower than my mother’s; 5. Much lower than my mother's; 6. My mother 
did not have a job while I was growing up OR my mother was not present  
12. When you were growing up, compared with Portuguese families back then, would you say 
your family income was: 
1. Far below average; 2. Below average; 3. Average; 4. Above- average; 5. Far above 
average  
13. Right now, compared with other Portuguese families, would you say your household 
income is: 
1. Far below average; 2. Below average; 3. Average; 4. Above- average; 5. Far above 
average 
14. In politics, it is customary to talk about left and right. How would you position yourself 
on this scale, where 1 represents the most left-wing position and 10 the most right-wing 
position? 
1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10 
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RANDOMIZED PERCEPTION EXPERIMENT 
Recent academic research has been exploring the link between one’s family background and 
one’s chances of making it in life. These recent academic studies have leveraged new large-
scale datasets to explore the opportunities to children from different family backgrounds and 
their chances of making it in life.  
We will now show you an image that summarizes the key findings of these studies. Please 
proceed to the next page when you are ready.  
 





15. How many out of 100 children coming from the poorest 100 families will grow up to be in 
each income group. 
1. The richest 100 families; 2. The second richest 100 families; 3. The middle 100 
families; 4. The second poorest 100 families; 5. The poorest 100 families 
 
Notes: In the left-hand side respondents are informed that it is extremely rare for a child born in a poor family 
to become rich later in life. On the right-hand side, the figure says that it is extremely rare for a child born in a 
rich family to become poor later in life.  
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16. Do you think the chances that a child from the poorest 100 families will grow up to be 
among the richest 100 families are: 
1. Close to zero; 2. Low; 3. Fairly low; 4. Fairly high; 5. High 
17. Do you think the chances that a child from the poorest 100 families will grow up to be 
among the second richest 100 families are: 
1. Close to zero; 2. Low; 3. Fairly low; 4. Fairly high; 5. High 
18. How do you feel about the following statement? “In Portugal, everybody has a chance to 
make it and be economically successful.” 
1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Neither agree nor disagree; 4. Disagree;5. Strongly 
disagree 
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19. What do you think would do more to make opportunities for children from poor and rich 
families less unequal? 
1. Lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage more investment 
in economic growth; 2. Raising taxes on wealthy people and corporations to expand 
programs for the poor. 
20. Do you support more policies to increase the opportunities for children born in poor 
families and to foster more equality of opportunity, such as education policies? Naturally, to 
finance an expansion of policies promoting equal opportunity, it would have to be the case 
that either other policies are scaled down or taxes are raised. 
1. I very strongly oppose more policies promoting equality of opportunity; 2. I oppose 
more policies promoting equality of opportunity; 3. I am indifferent; 4. I support more 
policies promoting equality of opportunity; 5. I very strongly support more policies 
promoting equality of opportunity. 
21. To reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born in poor and rich families, 
the government has the ability and the tools to do: 
1. Nothing at all; 2. Not much; 3. Some; 4. A lot 
22. The state collects a certain amount of income through the income tax (IRS) that it uses to 
maintain public spending. The average tax rate is the percentage of your income you pay on 
your IRS. For example, if you earn 12,000 € and pay 1,200 € in income tax, your average tax 
rate is 10%. 
Please adjust the bars below to tell us what, in your opinion, is the average fair tax rate that a 
family from each group should pay? 
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APPENDIX B.2. QUESTION ON PREFERRED INCOME AVERAGE TAX RATES FOR 
VARIOUS INCOME GROUPS 
 
23. We now ask you how you would like to spend the total government budget. Suppose that 
you are the person deciding on the U.S. budget for the next year. You can choose how you 
want to divide the budget between the following categories: Defense and National Security; 
Public Infrastructure; Education; Social Security; Health Care. 
 




24. In 2017, the Additional to the Municipal Real Estate Tax (AIMI) was created, which 
became known as "Imposto Mortágua". This tax is only paid by owners who own one or more 
properties in an amount exceeding 600 thousand euros. Therefore, in 2018, only 7% of 
properties paid AIMI. How would you rate your support for this tax? 
1. Strongly agree; 2. Agree; 3. Neither agree nor disagree; 4. Disagree; 5. Strongly 
disagree  
25. What is your gender? 
1. Female; 2. Male; 3. Other 
26. What is your age? 
27. Counting on you, how many people are in your household *?  
*"Households are generally considered to be the group of individuals, bound by family legal 
relationships, living in table communion and housing and the family economy." (INE) 
1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more 
28. What is your household's TOTAL annual income before mandatory contributions and 
taxes (gross income)? 
1. 0€-5.000€; 2. 5.001€-10.000€; 3. 10.001€-13.500€; 4. 13.501€-19.000€; 5. 
19.001€-27.500€; 6. 27.501€-32.500€; 7. 32.501€-40.000€, 8. 40.001€-50.000€; 9. 
50.001€-100.000€; 10. 100.001€-250.000€; 11. 250.000+€ 
29. Please indicate your marital status: 
1. Single; 2. Married or cohabiting (de facto union); 3. Other 
30. Were both of your parents born in Portugal? 
1. Yes; 2. No 
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31. In which county do you live? 
1. Aveiro; 2. Beja; 3. Braga; 4. Bragança; 5. Castelo Branco; 6. Coimbra; 7. Évora; 
8. Faro; 9. Guarda; 10. Leiria; 11. Lisboa; 12. Portalegre; 13. Porto; 14. Santarém; 
15. Setúbal; 16. Viana do Castelo; 17. Vila Real; 18. Viseu; 19. Islands; 20. Abroad 
32. Would you say you live in a: 
1. Rural area; 2. Small/ middle size city; 3. Big city 
 
